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To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a 
Bureaucratic Age 
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL† 
I 
“It’s late, . . . we must go and dress for dinner. For a few 
hours I have to act the part of a civilized man.”1 Thus did 
Fabrizio Corbèra, Prince of Salina, a Sicilian aristocrat and 
so a part of the court of the recently deposed Spanish 
Bourbon ruler of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, dismiss an 
emissary of Victor Emmanuel of Savoy, ruler of the Kingdom 
of Sardinia, soon to be the first king of a mostly united Italy. 
This emissary had asked Don Fabrizio to accept royal 
appointment as a member of the Senate of the new country, 
a constitutional monarchy. Don Fabrizio had declined. 
Of course, Don Fabrizio, the Leopard, so called because 
that animal dominated the family crest, is a largely fictional 
character, modeled after the great-grandfather of the author, 
Giuseppe di Lampedusa, himself a Sicilian aristocrat. The 
time depicted in The Leopard is, however, real—the few 
 
† U.B. Distinguished Professor of Law at the University at Buffalo, State 
University of New York. Jim Gardner’s effort in helping me think out this 
problem has been invaluable. A faculty seminar at the University at Buffalo 
School of Law was both helpful and enlightening. Conversations with Guyora, 
Michael, Joe, Tony, Matt and Bert were separately useful. Mark Fenster provided 
the Simpsons reference. 
 1. GUISEPPI DI LAMPEDUSA, THE LEOPARD 213 (Archibald Colquhoun trans., 
Pantheon Books Inc. 1960) (1958). The book was later made into one of Luchino 
Visconti’s arguably best movies, staring Bert Lancaster, Claudia Cardinale and 
Alan Delon. IL GATOPARDO (Twentieth Century Fox 1963). 
436 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
years of the Risorgimento following Garibaldi’s invasion of 
first Sicily, and thereafter the mainland around Naples. The 
novel is thus a portrait of an aristocracy in decline as the 
expanding bourgeois middle class begins its ascendancy. 
Among the many reasons the Prince gave for his 
unwillingness to serve in the new Senate, two stand out. The 
first is about Sicily. 
You talked to me about a young Sicily facing the marvels of the 
modern world; for my part I see instead a centenarian being dragged 
in a Bath chair around the Great Exhibition in London, 
understanding nothing and caring about nothing, whether it’s the 
steel factories of Sheffield or the cotton spinners of 
Manchester . . . .2 
The second is about himself. 
I am a member of the old ruling class, inevitably compromised with 
the Bourbon regime, and tied to it by chains of decency, if not of 
affection. I belong to an unfortunate generation, swung between the 
old world and the new, and I find myself ill at ease in both. And 
what is more . . . I am without illusions; what would the Senate do 
with me, an inexperienced legislator who lacks the faculty of self-
deception, essential requisite for wanting to guide others? We of our 
generation must draw aside and watch the capers and somersaults 
of the young around this ornate catafalque. Now you need young 
men, bright young men, with minds asking ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ 
and who are good at masking, at blending . . . their personal 
interests with vague public ideals.3 
And yet, despite Don Fabrizio’s obvious distaste for the 
concerns and values of the rising middle class and his sense 
of representing the values of a time past, he almost 
immediately suggests that the emissary consider a different 
appointee. That candidate is the quite unpolished, perhaps 
better seen as uncouth, but nonetheless wealthy. He is soon 
to be the father-in-law of the Don’s favorite, but 
 
 2. DI LAMPEDUSA, supra note 1, at 205–06. 
 3. Id. at 209. 
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impoverished nephew, Tancredi. This young man had 
defended his choice to join Garibaldi’s troops, by saying to his 
disapproving uncle, “Unless we ourselves take a hand now, 
they’ll foist a republic on us; if we want things to stay as they 
are, things must change.”4 
 
What is to be made of Don Fabrizio, a man who finds the 
future so much more than unappetizing that he is unwilling 
to participate in it, but yet is willing to attempt to advance 
the potential interests of his headstrong nephew, a young 
man who has already broken the heart of the Don’s eldest 
daughter? How should one respond to an unappetizing 
future, one whose job is “to guide others?” Should one play 
the part of a “civilized man,” and so “dress for dinner,” or 
instead “take a hand now,” lest the future be even worse? 
This question is a serious one for me. My students face a 
future that undermines the values that have grounded my 
teaching since I began this strange activity. However, before 
facing up to these questions, it seems useful to review a 
contrasting version of the Leopard’s story, this time in a film 
set about seventy years later. Change is coming, not to Sicily, 
but to somewhere along the Tennessee River, the Wild River 
of the film’s title, in the form of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s (TVA) attempt to tame that river by building a 
series of dams that would also provide plentiful electric 
power to the area.5 The story is not told from the point of 
 
 4. Id. at 40. 
 5. WILD RIVER (Twentieth Century Fox 1960) is an Elia Kazan movie staring 
Montgomery Clift, Lee Remick and Jo van Fleet. The screenplay of Wild River 
was written by Paul Osborne, known for writing the screenplays of South Pacific, 
East of Eden, The Yearling, The World of Suzie Wong and Sayonara. He fashioned 
the story from two books. Mud on the Stars provided the location, including the 
river island farm, and the character of Ella Garth. See generally WILLIAM 
BRADFORD HUIE, MUD ON THE STARS (1942). Dunbar’s Cove provided the young 
TVA bureaucrat who falls in love with a relative of a property owner, though in 
this novel the country farmer who is central to the story is the father of the girl, 
not the grandmother. See generally BORDEN DEAL, DUNBAR’S COVE (1957). Neither 
novel provided significant dialog, though the last paragraph of the second 
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view of the Leopard, but from that of Tancredi, of the younger 
generation, represented by Chuck Glover, an earnest, 
idealistic, naïve young man sent out from TVA headquarters 
in Washington to handle a problem. 
The problem is Ella Garth, matriarch to a rather 
unsavory clan of hardscrabble farmers, and an even larger 
collection of negroes, probably sharecroppers, working a soon 
to be flooded island in the middle of the Tennessee River. 
Chuck’s task is to convince Ella to sell her land and move to 
better housing higher up in the valley—a task that several 
others have undertaken, only to fail. Washington is afraid 
that there will be political repercussions if Ella is either 
forced off her land or left there and stubbornly drowns. 
Chuck is their go-to guy. 
After Chuck’s first attempt to meet Ella results in his 
being thrown in the river by her “boys,” the old woman sends 
them to apologize for the rough treatment. Assuming that 
the apology is an invitation of sorts, Chuck returns only to be 
told by Ella that she will not sell  
the land I’ve poured my heart’s blood in. You don’t love the land. 
You love your land. ‘Electricity,’ I expect that’s what you call 
progress. Taking away people’s souls, putting electricity in place of 
them, ain’t progress. Not the way I see it.6 
Still, Ella tells the negroes that they may leave the 
island and makes no effort to dissuade her granddaughter, 
Carol, who is falling in love with Chuck, from doing so as 
well. 
Two more trips back to the island, the first drunk and 
the second to apologize for having been drunk, do nothing to 
change Ella’s mind, and indeed leave Chuck crying out, “Mrs. 
Garth, what are you trying to prove?” to a resolutely closed 
door. In the end, it takes an order of eviction, signed by a 
federal judge and served by a U.S. marshal to force Ella, 
 
provided the movie’s title. 
6 WILD RIVER (Twentieth Century Fox 1960). 
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wearing her good cloth coat, to leave. When her 
granddaughter offers to carry a small, obviously cardboard 
suitcase, Ella refuses and, as she walks past Chuck, 
commands, “Well, what you waiting for.” Though she settles 
into the new house that Chuck has had specially constructed 
for her, complete with a porch for her rocker, Ella dies as soon 
as her land is inundated. Chuck and Carol leave for a new 
life in Washington. 
The structural similarities between The Leopard and 
Wild River are obvious, though less interesting than their 
differences. Ella, like Don Fabrizio, sees an abhorrent future 
and draws back from it. Though less willing than he to 
compromise with that future, she makes it clear, as does the 
Don, that she will not interfere with the choice of the younger 
generation, with Carol’s new found love or with the desire of 
the negroes to secure better housing and well-paying, if 
temporary, jobs off the island. But, Wild River is a movie 
focused on the young people. Like Tancredi, Chuck has 
enlisted as an agent of the future order. However, unlike 
Tancredi, Chuck comes to doubt the value of that order when, 
as a result of his interaction with Ella in her stubbornness, 
he realizes that the progress that the TVA brings to the 
valley—electricity and housing and industry—will destroy a 
way of life that, if not attractive to him, is at least meaningful 
to those living in that valley. He tries to temporize on behalf 
of the new order, but only after the old one shows its ugly 
underside—two sound thrashings delivered by the town 
bully, a defender of the old ways, especially white 
supremacy—can Chuck act decisively in favor of the newer 
one that brought him to the valley in the first place. And so 
his indecision adds another question to our initial ones. Is it 
plausible to temporize between past, present and future? 
II 
Let me start to answer these questions by first acquiring 
an understanding of the past and a glimpse of the future. 
Born, raised, and educated in the Midwest, I attended the 
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University of Chicago Law School at a time when law and 
economics was anything but central to an overwhelmingly 
politically conservative curriculum, and left understanding 
that law, at least when well-practiced, was a matter of 
handicraft. My guess is that most of my classmates came out 
with a similar understanding. Whether the matter at hand 
was a complex financial transaction or a piece of litigation, 
the lawyer’s job was the same—to fashion the judicial and 
legislative materials of law and the conventional ways of its 
practice into a form that would accomplish a given client’s 
purpose as well as could be done, and hopefully that would 
manage to transform these materials at hand into a “better,” 
“more just”—most of us thought we knew what those words 
meant—species of law. 
Though Robert Hutchins, patron saint of the University, 
if not its Law School, may have derided “the how to do it” law 
school,7 I did not experience legal education as an example of 
the teaching of low level practice, but as technê, as knowledge 
gained from doing, much as knowledge of legal theory is 
gained from doing the critical analysis of judicial and 
legislative materials. Indeed, it was the experience of low-
level practice, of the preparation of the summons and 
complaint or the notice of motion together with the proof of 
service, which was the surprise. Working out the theory that 
informed the complaint or the proper way of presenting the 
argument in a brief and then preparing these documents met 
our expectations of what it was to be a lawyer. If I had 
complained about law school’s failure to prepare me for 
practice, it would have been about a failure to sufficiently 
stress the theory that informed practice—for example the 
theoretical understanding of how to translate a rule of law 
into a set of allegations in a complaint sufficient to withstand 
a motion to dismiss. 
 
 7. See Robert M. Hutchins, The University Law School, in THE LAW SCHOOL 
OF TOMORROW: THE PROJECTION OF AN IDEAL 5, 5–6 (David Haber & Julius Cohen 
eds., 1968). 
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My experience of practice was of a hard, but honest living 
in a legal services office. I was professionally offended when 
an opponent too openly or too un-self-consciously turned the 
practice of law into a routine activity, whether it was by filing 
what was obviously the same motion to dismiss with the 
same brief, or the same set of boilerplate discovery requests 
in every case without regard to the narrow case-specific 
considerations that made cases distinguishable, indeed 
separately interesting. Such actions turned into a matter of 
vulgar, bureaucratic regularity something that I understood 
as anything but. 
All of which was not to say that I did not experience from 
time to time the desultory routinization of law; I practiced in 
the Municipal Court of Chicago where, if papers were not 
ordered so that the check covering fees was on top of the 
summons which was on top of the complaint, the clerk would 
discipline the offender by throwing the pile back at the 
attorney filing the case in such a way that these papers 
would land on the dirty floor. Nevertheless, such experiences 
were to be counted as deviations, and unwelcome ones, from 
what was legal practice properly understood. 
When I entered teaching, I experienced a difference 
between the law school I had been graduated from and the 
one at which I taught. At Chicago, only the insane worried 
about passing the bar exam. At Buffalo, where I began and 
remain teaching, a significant portion of the students were 
concerned about bar passage and rightly so, given the high 
degree of correlation between LSAT score and bar passage. 
This was not an elite school. Yet, a significant portion of my 
students saw law pretty much as I had. It was a handicraft 
and an absorbing one. These students were hungry to learn 
what this handicraft was all about, what needed to be known 
in order to be good at it. Of course, questions of earning a 
living were never suppressed; most nascent producers of 
handcrafted products recognize the need to earn a living. 
Still, it was not then implausible for a dean to wish his 
graduates that they should experience law as a matter of 
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“doing well, by doing good,” in Ben Franklin’s words. In line 
with such a vision of what it was to be a lawyer, many 
students understood, or at least acted as if they understood, 
that learning was significantly a matter of grasping the 
“why” of law—the theories, and so, the reasons that informed 
both bodies of doctrine and the various practices of lawyers. 
So, for them, critique of such theories was a crucial part of 
learning the law, a part of becoming a lawyer. 
Today, I most often experience a very different 
understanding of law and lawyering on the largest part of my 
students. They are anything but hungry to learn. Perhaps 
they are sated even from too much learning. Pride in craft is 
noticeably lacking except for a few students taking courses 
that seem to them to be narrowly relevant to a future 
practice clearly envisioned.8 Indeed, the transformation of 
“relevance” from being central to a sixties plea for more 
courses related to contemporary social problems, to being 
central to a demand for courses of ever more narrowly 
conceived short-term usefulness, is a source of sadness.9 
In this world of law study, critique, a central part of my 
 
 8. A good example are the students taking my colleagues’ courses, Isabel 
Marcus’ class on domestic violence or Judith Olin’s similar clinic. 
 9. I experienced the late sixties cry for “relevance” as a category mistake, a 
failure to understand the theoretical centrality of the verbs “to get” and “to spend” 
to the law’s understanding of itself. Some people will be surprised at this 
statement, coming as it does from a still self-identifying member of the 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies (CLS). While there is reason to question 
that affiliation, as some members of the group have done, because I found the 
critique part of CLS more to my liking than some of the politics which I found 
anything but capable of surviving the application of that critique, what I shared 
then with most of the CLS crew, and still hold now, is a dislike of liberal 
politics/policy/political theory. The endless balancing of this against that has 
always offended me because it avoids the obligation of anyone purporting to 
represent another or to judge on behalf of a polity to recognize the positional 
obligation to exercise judgment, to choose, and so, to accept that obligation as a 
personal one, as putting one’s being on the line, as it were. The endless wringing 
of one’s hands at the tragedy of choice has long struck me as the best evidence 
that liberals are psychologically unfit to govern, in any of the senses of that 
polysemous word, for accompanying their every choice is always an attempt to 
deflect criticism with a prepared apology. Fitness to govern is better evidenced 
by the willingness to accept criticism of choice and act upon it when appropriate. 
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experience of legal education, is an unwelcome intrusion into 
the job of becoming a lawyer. Indeed, at times, it seems that 
almost everything other than the thinnest, narrowest, most 
quickly comprehended material, delivered much as the 
classic heroin addict’s plea, “straight in the arm,” is an 
imposition on the life of the law student, a life conceived as 
moving on, getting this over with, as an endless series of 
occasions to hit the “page down” button on the computer 
program that is learning. Maybe even on the computer 
program that is life. 
There seems to be no time patiently to learn a handicraft 
either, and if there were time, no inclination to use such time 
in this way. Any decrease in the breadth of materials covered 
in any class is no longer an occasion for exploring the 
remaining material in more detail in the name of gaining a 
better sense of how law works, but is taken as a contribution 
toward an ever-expanding pile of unnamed, possibly 
unnamable, other things to do. Training in legal research 
and writing seems to be a hurdle to be jumped over, a hurdle 
seen in terms of the minutiae of citation form and routine, 
idiomatic legal usage, but not as an occasion to work on the 
primary task of producing argument in readable, effective 
English prose. And both seem to be completely divorced from 
the activity of keeping a job once that elusive goal, on which 
all student attention seems to be focused, is attained. 
III 
In struggling to understand why and how this change 
took place, I can offer two accounts. One emphasizes 
interrelated alterations in the structure of the American 
university and of the economy in which the legal practice for 
which our students understand themselves to be preparing, 
takes place. The other emphasizes changes in the cultural 
practices and outlooks that our students bring with them to 
law school. These accounts are not mutually exclusive, 
though they may be mutually reinforcing and likely reflect 
similar underlying social tectonics. For present purposes, 
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these possible interactions are not particularly important. 
Start by revisiting the history of the social formation that 
is the American university. The contemporary university is 
not the descendant of the small denominational college of the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, though some 
prominent universities have such a lineage. Rather, it is the 
descendant of the German university, specifically von 
Humboldt’s University of Berlin. Von Humboldt conceived of 
an institution combining the faculty’s practice of 
Wissenschaft, the acquisition of objective, scholarly 
knowledge about the worlds of nature and of human affairs 
designed to disclose the truth, seen as a philosophical unity, 
and its transmission of this knowledge to students who 
independently were attempting to develop their own 
wissenschaftlich understanding of the world. Both faculty 
and students were thus participating in the lifelong process 
of Bildung, the development of an individual’s intellectual 
and moral, that is, human potential—a potential 
encompassing the ideal of the cultivated man embedded in a 
fully social and political context. This cultural unity was 
expected to create, and so to embody, the core of an ethnic 
German nation-state. 
The students that von Humboldt envisioned for his 
ethnic German university were of the minor nobility and the 
various parts of the non-noble upper classes. He understood 
that the male children of the narrow middle class were to be 
remitted to the Technishe Hochschules or Instituten. When, 
in the 1870s, von Humboldt’s ideas were transferred to the 
United States, two problems needed to be faced: cultural 
unity and social relations. The nation lacked von Humboldt’s 
idealist understanding of a cultural identity that might serve 
as the philosophical unity for the American state. And the 
lack of a nobility meant that the American social structure 
was far different from the German.10 
 
 10. John Henry Schlegel, From High in the Paper Tower, An Essay on Von 
Humboldt’s University, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 865, 867–68 (2004). 
2018] TO DRESS FOR DINNER 445 
When it came to establishing a cultural identity, the best 
the American university could do was to produce a student 
well-versed in American letters and, even here, there were 
problems. As a result of the Morrill Act of 1862, which 
provided for the support of “agriculture and the mechanic 
arts,” technical training was to be had within the university, 
not outside of it.11 American letters was hardly a central part 
of such a technical education. Still, letters had the advantage 
that it was vaguely continuous with the curriculum of the 
denominational college that had long provided some students 
with a pre-professional education for the study of law, 
medicine, and theology. Such a traditional curriculum had 
included a modicum of science and political economy. So, 
when in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the sciences professionalized and the social sciences hived off 
into their own, separate professional orders, letters came to 
stand as central to a broader range of studies—the “liberal 
arts” (and sciences). Still, identifying a unity that might hold 
together the American university of professionally 
fragmented arts and sciences departments, various technical 
fields, such as engineering, and professional schools, such as 
medicine and law, was anything but easy. 
A changing social structure presented equally difficult 
problems. The denominational college had long served the 
slender upper and upper-middle classes. That relationship 
continued in the growing American university. However, the 
change from an agricultural and commercial economy to one 
that was centered in mass manufacturing and 
transportation networks brought the appearance of a new 
piece of the middle class: middle management. This group, 
variously found in both the upper-middle and the once-
largely artisanal, middle-middle classes, now had choices of 
where and how to educate its children and exercised them. 
Some invested in social class and so sent their children away 
 
 11. Land-Grant Agricultural and Mechanical College Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 
37-130, 12 Stat. 503, 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–349 
(2012)). 
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for the liberal arts education that supposedly fit them for the 
professions. Others, perhaps less economically secure, or 
maybe only less delusional, sent theirs away with the hope 
that they would receive a more technical education, which 
came to include the business school. By the 1930s, social 
fragmentation had thus reinforced educational 
fragmentation. 
Interestingly, the Cold War that followed the much 
hotter World War II initially lead to an increased emphasis 
on letters, renamed literary studies. Such studies were 
briefly seen as the core of Western values, and so Western 
higher education, understood as in opposition to the more 
science- and technology-centered Communist values, and so, 
Eastern higher education. But soon, the prestige of science 
derived from wartime engineering and the “Sputnik crisis” 
brought a sense that the worlds of science and letters were 
so different that, in C.P. Snow’s words, they comprised “two 
cultures.”12 Any further pretense that the university 
represented a cultural unity became impossible. 
Within the university, the response to this impossibility 
was the substitute of a superficial, but at least substantive, 
cultural unity that was literary studies, with an artificial 
one—a culture of excellence, sometime derided as the 
University of Excellence.13 Excellence was a classic post-
 
 12. See generally C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND A SECOND LOOK (1963). 
 13. The University of Excellence is brutally, but wonderfully explored in BILL 
READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUINS (1996), a book that would be required 
reading for every university leader were it not written in the obscure language of 
Eighties and Nineties LitCrit. 
Friends have objected to my endorsement of Readings’ excoriation of the term 
“excellence” as utterly lacking substance. They argue that much of Readings’ 
attack is leveled against a straw man as no one really believes that “excellence” 
is something that can be recommended or pursued without an underlying 
conception of in what it consists. Instead, excellence can only exist in relation to 
role-specific behavior, and can only be measured by the standards applicable to 
some particular role and so what Readings really objects to is the watered-down 
conception of excellence that in his view the modern university not only pursues, 
but also inculcates. This is a well-meant observation, but dubious to anyone who 
has listened carefully to a half hour of presidential rhetoric and chooses to 
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modern absence, a space without quality that thus could be 
filled with any metric. Internally, it quite quickly became the 
University of Administration, as non-teaching professionals 
multiplied like coat hangers in a dark closet. As part of a 
society obsessed with the ever-changing language of 
management, as well as its definition of value as output per 
unit cost, the University’s metrics were both financial and 
resource utilization—tuition dollars and full-time 
equivalents (FTEs). Externally, the absence was quickly and 
quite arbitrarily filled with assessments, rankings or what-
have-yous that measured nothing in the world at all, but 
instead reflected back the measurer’s preferences, generally 
understood as an ordinal array; although the objects 
measured, whether universities as a whole or schools or 
programs with in them, quite likely were close to normally 
distributed. The culture of excellence became the culture of 
the treadmill—endless striving to catch up with the ever-
advancing leaders in a race for distinct advantage, but with 
indistinct purpose. 
Meanwhile, major changes were taking place in the 
American social structure. At the end of World War II, the 
economy of high wages and high prices that was legislated, 
though not experienced, during the Depression created a 
 
substitute an irrelevant word, say “kale,” every time that “excellence” appears. 
The meaning changes not one wit, but it quickly becomes obvious that it is 
particularly inappropriate for an institution of higher education to play this fast 
and loose with signifiers. 
Even more disreputable is the obvious meaning that is the University of Ex-
cellence. The University’s excellence is that of a discipline and its norms and of 
peer review. Ironically, this is the revenge of the professionalization process that 
created the American university. By making knowing possible, the disciplines 
now act through their credentialing function to limit the knowable as well. Taken 
together, the university’s bureaucratic personnel process and its disciplinary 
base thus have created a species of tyranny designed to avoid the difficult judg-
ment of the individual value of a scholar’s, a department’s or even a university’s 
scholarship, by means of the endless deferral of judgment to others who similarly 
defer their judgment to others, who similarly defer their judgment, ad infinitum, 
ad nauseum. Real excellence is personal to the actor. The judgmental buck stops 
there and so humility on the part of humans is required, in contrast to the arro-
gance of disciplinary self-assurance, and so self-satisfaction. 
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twenty-five-year boom. Accompanying this boom was both a 
population explosion, the Baby Boom, and a great downward 
expansion of the middle class as unionized workers, 
primarily in mass manufacturing industries, experienced 
middle class earnings for the first time. The existence of a 
mass middle class made aspirations for social advancement 
easier to envision and at the same time made delineations of 
the subtle substrata of that class more difficult, as the color 
of the worker’s collar lost salience. Given the purportedly 
meritocratic bias that distinguishes our relatively 
democratic, but hardly egalitarian society, the expansion of 
college education that followed with the adolescence of the 
children who comprised the Baby Boom generation meant 
that college graduation changed from a clean marker of 
upper-middle class status to no more than a secure grip on 
middle-middle class status. 
These boom years were followed by the Great Inflation of 
the seventies, which was in turn followed by another boom in 
the eighties and nineties. Inflation followed by boom 
partially hid the hollowing out of the unionized mass 
manufacturing sector, turned one wage earner families into 
two wage earner families, and stripped out many middle 
management jobs from newly leaner corporate entities. It 
also brought a great expansion of low-wage service 
employment and an increase in the cubicle warrior jobs that 
required a college degree, neither of which offered a clear 
route to middle management. These changes squeezed the 
newly expanded middle class and stressed families 
generally. 
 Increasingly, it seemed that the only sure route to a 
well-paying job, and so a weak, necessary, but hardly 
sufficient, grip on upper-middle class status, was either a 
technical degree, often including a master’s degree, or a post-
graduate professional degree. Thus, protecting one’s high 
school GPA began to take on inordinate importance as a 
strong transcript, together with strong standardized 
admission test scores and endless participation in 
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“activities,” seemed to be the only way to secure a place in 
one of the “better” colleges or universities. 
Once in college, the same concerns—transcript, test 
scores and activities—dominated student life, for college had 
turned from an objective to a stop, but not necessarily a rest, 
along the achievement highway. As a result, the broad, 
cultural education offered in the traditional liberal arts 
declined in attractiveness, then fell by the wayside. In 
technical fields, the same thing happened to those 
undergraduate and graduate courses that were deemed 
irrelevant to burnishing credentials for any necessary 
certification test or future employment. In sum, for students, 
von Humboldt’s university had turned into either an overly 
administered, but not very effective, employment service or 
several tune up laps around the track before the next big 
challenge—getting a place in one of the “better” graduate or 
professional schools. 
Given these changes in the social understanding of 
undergraduate education, it is hardly surprising that law 
students, already inhabitants of the world that von 
Humboldt’s university has become, might easily slide, if not 
jump, into disconnecting the substance of professional 
education from the goal of getting and keeping employment. 
For them, getting the job might come to be understood as the 
important part, the affirmation of a desirable and so desired 
social status, the paper prerequisite for entering the upper-
middle class. In contrast, keeping that job, doing law, might 
just as easily be understood primarily as participation in a 
bureaucratic enterprise of the kind that students regularly 
had passed through, successfully they might add, for close to 
twenty years. And in a very real sense, such students would 
not be wrong. 
Consider social status first—always a good idea in a 
status-conscious, status-denying county. As is the case with 
any marker of status, its achievement is easily separated 
from its content. It is precisely this separation that the U.S. 
News & World Report rankings of everything play into. A 
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question about what one might have learned became easily 
subsumed into the question of where one might have learned. 
A top-twenty school offered more cachet than a top-forty 
school and a top-five, more than a top-twenty, though a 
degree from none of these schools offered but insignificant 
evidence that anything at all had been learned, especially 
given the obvious correlation between parent social status, 
standardized test scores, and institutional rank. In such a 
world, it is far more important to get to the finish line with 
an unscarred academic record than to learn anything. 
Indeed, learning may be irrelevant. Again, given the 
modestly democratic ethos of our society, an ethos that 
pushes for the production of more, similarly credentialed 
individuals, rather than fewer, better-trained ones, most 
employers make their initial cut of whom to interview wholly 
on the basis of the status of the school and the relative place 
in the graduating class of the student. Only after exercising 
this easy rule of thumb is there any good reason for such 
employers to begin to cull among the similarly qualified by 
relying on personality, dress, handshake, eye contact, 
quickness, and other obvious, but irrelevant surrogates for 
having learned something useful. After all, if the first hire 
doesn’t work out because the degree and the smile 
accompanying it hides the absence of, rather than evidences 
the acquisition of, useful knowledge, there always will be 
many more candidates in line to fill the job. In a world where 
employers act in this way, spending time building a resume 
and improving networking skills may indeed be a better use 
of a law student’s time than learning the refinements of any 
body of doctrine or marginally improving the ability to craft 
an argument in an already wholly clichéd English language 
or even acquiring a better understanding of the institutions 
with which clients regularly interact. 
Second, consider the nature of legal practice that young 
lawyers experience today. However plausible it once was to 
understand legal practice as a species of handicraft when I 
was in law school—after all, the modern form of plea 
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bargaining dates no later than the twenties prosecutions for 
Prohibition violations and the routinization of tort cases 
dates from a similar time when the automobile became a 
ubiquitous part of the urban landscape—it is wholly bizarre 
to see most contemporary legal practice as other than a 
species of bureaucratic administration, or at least as an 
enterprise of mass production. Handcrafting personalized 
legal solutions to client problems still survives in the 
representation of the wealthiest families and the most 
prosperous businesses, in small subspecies of governmental 
representation and in the more exotic corners of public 
interest practice, but it has largely disappeared everywhere 
else. A mass society brings bureaucratic solutions to its 
problems. Forms are so ubiquitous in our society that we 
seldom even notice them. 
The best evidence of the bureaucratic nature of 
contemporary legal practice is the wild proliferation of 
paraprofessionals in even the fanciest of law firms. The 
faithful secretary who “ran” the office for small practitioners 
with concentrated practices—for example, real estate, 
divorce, worker’s compensation, probate, or personal 
bankruptcy—is both long storied and evidence of the 
routinization of many practices during the mid-twentieth 
century. But the expansion of such routine work into areas 
of finance and litigation in the largest firms, well enough 
known that it has become fodder for novels and movies, says 
mountains about the nature of such practice, as well as about 
the difficulty of creating a model for the delivery of legal 
services that can support partner salaries in such firms at 
their immodest level, a level initially driven by investment 
banker envy, but eventually by reported per partner 
earnings of competitors—a level way above lifestyle needs. 
Here again can be seen, but on the law firm side, the 
unthinking adoption of the ever-changing language of 
management, as well as its definition of value as output per 
unit cost. 
If examples of serious and sustained handcrafted 
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production of legal work are seldom to be experienced, it is 
not surprising that students should act as if knowledge of 
how to do such things is largely irrelevant to their education. 
The ability carefully to craft a complaint or brief is of little 
importance if most of the jobs that students can conceive of 
consist primarily of moving paper from the right side of the 
desk to the left. And much the same is the case where the 
dollar amount of a transaction severely constrains the dollar 
amount of fees that can be justified by, and so the hours that 
can reasonably be devoted to, generating the perfect set of 
transactional documents. How students can come to 
understand such things before having experienced practice 
has long escaped me, but then, deep cultural understandings 
are often quite mysterious. Indeed, since entering law school, 
I have been bewildered by how it is that students come to law 
school believing that learning law is learning doctrine when 
they have never been there before—not that this is their only 
misconception. 
IV 
Here, then, is where the historical account should be 
supplemented by an account that acknowledges the cultural 
aspects of what as a law teacher I find myself experiencing—
the raw phenomenology of attempting to teach today’s 
students. On a daily basis, the dominant feature of the 
landscape I inhabit as teacher is, after all, the behavior of 
students in the classroom, and, in particular, the aspects of 
character that appear to guide their behavior in ways that 
are, if not impossible to comprehend, at least deeply 
dismaying to behold. Much has changed over forty years. 
First and foremost—and here the historical-economic 
account is most directly relevant—many of our students, 
perhaps most, don’t really want to be lawyers. Or, to put this 
more accurately, they don’t really want to be lawyers in the 
sense that I understand what it means to want to be a 
lawyer. I speak here not of motivations to enter the practice 
of law—to right wrongs, to help the helpless, to make good 
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money, to get into politics, to wait out a bad economy, to 
satisfy one’s parents; students have always entered law 
schools with some mix of these motivations and still do. 
Rather, students do not appear to equate wanting to be a 
lawyer with wanting to be a good lawyer—a skillful lawyer, 
a successful lawyer, a winning lawyer, a decent and ethical 
lawyer, a lawyer who knows the craft—a lawyer, in short, 
who is admired by other lawyers and by judges who are in a 
position to recognize the difference between a good lawyer, 
worthy of emulation, and a mediocre or poor one, worthy of 
at best silent pity, and at worst contempt. 
In nearly every large course I have taught for 
significantly more than the past few years, a time comes in 
the semester when I have the urge to deliver a message: 
“Unless you plan to live a life as a river pirate standing aside 
the routine legal transactions of daily life with your hand out 
to collect a toll, you misunderstand what it is to be a good 
lawyer. Good lawyers are not paid for delivering certain 
answers to routine questions. Good lawyers earn the big 
bucks you all hope to make by putting their butt on the line, 
by exercising the best possible judgment in circumstances 
where answers are unlikely and advice only possible in terms 
of better or worse alternatives.” Forty years ago, this 
message might have secured many students’ attention. They 
might have looked up as knowing smiles crept across their 
faces. “That’s right,” they might have said to themselves 
silently, “I am here to become good lawyer; help me to learn 
to exercise good legal judgment.” Twenty years ago not as 
many would have sat up and taken notice. Lately, should I 
choose to deliver that message, it distressingly comes out 
sounding more like a plea and elicits from my students not a 
jolt of self-recognition, but an equally palpable sensation of 
distanced curiosity. How strange, they think to themselves; 
what can any of this law possibly have to do with the exercise 
of judgment? 
Here, historical and economic explanations of this 
phenomenon do not suffice. Those who undertake to train for 
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a profession, and invest considerable time and money in the 
enterprise, yet do not aspire to provide their clients with the 
best possible judgment available to the profession for which 
they train, suffer from something more than a set of poor 
incentives; they suffer from a defect of character. 
Even if it is true that the practice of law in the world our 
students will inhabit is desultory and bureaucratic, it is one 
thing to recognize that one’s professional life rarely will 
afford opportunities to practice law creatively and 
satisfyingly, and quite another to reject as irrelevant the 
acquisition of the craft necessary to do so should the 
opportunity arise. In truth, the only thing that has 
distinguished practicing law from flipping burgers, in any 
era, has been, not the daily absence of tedium, but the fact 
that perhaps once a month, a lawyer may face a problem that 
cannot be handled by resort to the formulaic responses and 
the boilerplate that lawyer has deployed a hundred times 
before. Judgment, craft, creativity, and even wit occasionally 
may be found highly useful, even if not strictly required. The 
cubicle-warrior, in contrast, may pass an entire career 
without ever facing a problem that demands or even invites 
the exercise of any interesting kind of occupational 
judgment. 
If law students were in a position to understand what 
skills they need to acquire and to what degree of proficiency 
in order to have a chance of practicing law well in those 
moments, rare or otherwise, that permit or invite the 
exercise of satisfying agency—those moments that confirm 
one’s very humanity—their lack of interest in what a good 
legal education would require of them might be understood 
merely as a lack of understanding. But students are, of 
course, by definition, in no position to understand such 
questions and so their impulses must arise from other 
sources. Two factors suggest themselves. 
First, it seems that students no longer believe in the 
value, or even the instrumental utility, of hard work. Or 
perhaps, it is that their conception of hard work is different 
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from mine. To today’s students, work appears to mean the 
willingness to sit at a computer clicking around the internet 
until the answer to some question is located. It follows for 
such students that hard work consists of clicking around the 
internet for as long as it takes to find the answer. The idea 
that hard work might consist of exploring the contents of 
one’s own head seemingly occurs to a few of them or, if it does 
occur to them, they evidently discard it as implausible on the 
ground that cultivating the skill of independent, critical 
thinking is nothing a teacher could possibly have reason to 
demand.14 In any event, they do not very often exhibit the 
kinds of behavior that I think of as hard work: close, 
laborious, critical reading of texts; careful and self-critical 
reflection; and, repeated practice in basic analytic thinking. 
Instead, they are intellectually passive and dependent; 
everything must be provided to them, pointed out to them, 
explained to them. Nothing is for them to discover, and in so 
doing, to learn the art of discovery. They must not only be 
told what to do, but also reminded repeatedly to do it. To 
provide them with information in, say, a syllabus in the 
 
 14. Some of my interlocutors have asked me to explain what I mean by 
“critical thinking.” I have hesitated to do so because of the way that this 
seemingly ordinary activity from my youth has been debased in the high school 
and college of today, as well as highjacked as an indication of merit (or demerit) 
in various political debates of academic topicality. The use of “critical” in Critical 
Theory, Critical Marxism, and Critical Legal Studies has not been helpful either. 
But out of deference to good friends, here goes. 
Critical thinking is the activity of reading against (and sometimes across) the 
grain, whether the grain is that of written materials, understandings of human 
behavior, or of human institutions in an attempt to gain a different perspective 
(sometimes erroneously described as a deeper or truer perspective) as to how, 
why, or wherefore these objects act or are intended to act. Critical thinking is 
often seen as inherently derived from particular, assumedly totalizing social the-
ories—such as structuralism, Freudianism, various Marxisms, economisms or po-
litical preferences, but such a stereotypical identification is unnecessary and per-
haps inimical to critical thought. Rather, critical thinking is simply skeptical (but 
hopefully not corrosively so) thinking that refuses to take surface understandings 
for granted, but instead requires that they, as well as alternative understandings, 
be supported only after being put under serious intellectual pressure designed to 
identify possible weaknesses or errors before putting those understandings into 
use. 
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expectation that it will stay provided is, in their view, a kind 
of magical thinking. The entire burden of their progress 
depends on their teachers who are in charge of their 
education, and thus, of their success. If they fail, it is because 
their teachers have failed. 
Sadly, evidence of the value of old-fashioned, self-
motivated hard work is, at least for the moment, all around 
students, if only they could perceive it. There are always 
some students, often older, usually with prior work 
experience, who understand that they are capable of 
affecting their futures through the exercise of personal 
agency, and that doing so requires exertion, initiative, and 
some degree of enterprise. These are the students who 
impress their professors and, if they work during law school, 
their employers. They collect a disproportionate share of 
available opportunities, not because they are smarter or 
luckier, but because they demonstrate to people in a position 
to know that they have the makings of truly good 
practitioners. Much comes to them because they deserve it. 
Even among students who have some vague appreciation 
of the value of self-motivation and enterprise, the concept is 
sometimes bizarrely mistranslated. Students increasingly 
seem to believe that the kind of enterprise they should 
exhibit consists in pounding the pavement endlessly to 
scrounge up work of any kind, no matter how worthless, or 
even inimical, to their development as professionals. They 
call this “building a resume.” In reality—or at least what I 
would like to believe is reality—the kind of enterprise in 
which they should invest their time consists instead in 
finding opportunities to hone a degree of professional craft 
that will, in the end, make them desirable for what they can 
actually do, as opposed to what they can say they have done. 
Second, it seems that students no longer see a connection 
between what teachers do, in or out of the classroom, and 
what they do, or can imagine themselves doing in or out of 
the classroom. Perhaps they are no longer capable of 
perceiving who we are, or the relationship between our 
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characteristics as persons and as professionals, or between 
our characteristics as persons and professionals and our 
behavior. The notion that in their daily life teachers are 
learners and that what we do best is to help students learn, 
as they will have to do pretty much on their own for the rest 
of their life, seems to be impossible for students to 
comprehend. Instead, they seem to think of us as simply 
“professors,” members of a class of artificial entities, like 
video game avatars, that have been designed by young people 
a lot like themselves to help them check off the requirements 
for a license to practice law—itself evidently a strange relic 
of a bygone era about as comprehensible as a shiny black 
monolith on the lunar surface. Teachers are incarnate 
Wikipedias—sources of information, at least when behaving 
themselves; things to be clicked on periodically should a 
question require an answer. The perverse insistence that our 
students acquire professional skills and knowledge through 
their own hard, independent, though not unassisted, work, 
and our puzzling refusal to buy the ingredients, cook the 
meal, set the table, and wash the dishes makes us, perhaps, 
like some kind of bad hyperlinks, annoying malfunctions, the 
proper response to which is to browse elsewhere for better 
and more responsive sources. 
V 
With this understanding of law students and legal 
practice established, at least to my satisfaction, it should be 
obvious that living in such a world might create problems for 
a teacher. In order to help other teachers address these 
problems, I offer first an Aristotelian approach to them that, 
while not congenial to me, is congenial to other teachers I 
know.15 I follow with my own approach. 
 
 15. My Aristotelian teacher is not a straw man to bat at, but rather my 
synthesis of conversations with several teachers whom I have respected over 
many years. I know that there are many possible frameworks for approaching 
the problems identified in this piece, but I would be unable to present most of 
them empathetically and so I have simply limited myself to this one and my own. 
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An individual who thinks about teaching through an 
Aristotelian lens16 sees the professional world as populated 
by roles, and believes that success is to a significant degree 
properly understood as a matter of how ably an individual 
performs the role inhabited. The most obvious role for a 
teacher of lawyers is that of a successful, high-performing 
lawyer. Central to that role is the idea of precisely what the 
best work of such a lawyer would comprise. A teacher who 
subscribes to this image of the highest quality of lawyering 
believes she is obliged to attempt to lead her students to 
embrace it. It prominently centers upon the kind of mastery 
of handicraft described earlier, but it also includes something 
more. She does not confine her teaching to what she thinks 
will be useful to her students as practitioners, but also feels 
obliged to teach them what will be useful to them as citizens, 
and particularly citizens of a democracy, and even more 
particularly as lawyer-citizens, who occupy a somewhat 
unusual socio-political niche. What law students therefore 
most need to be taught is the discipline and practice of 
critical thinking, and indeed of critique itself, the model of 
good teaching she inherited from her best teachers in high 
school, college, and law school, and from her best mentors in 
the working world. 
The difficulty for an Aristotelian teacher, however, 
consists of this. Students, she has come to suspect, au fond 
no longer genuinely respect such an objective, and in 
consequence discount the value of such teaching. Because 
they do not respect such a teacher, they do not admire her, 
and because they do not admire her, they do not seek to 
 
I invite my readers, should there be any at this point, who are not comfortable 
with the alternatives I present, to address these problems though their own 
favored frameworks. It is the problems that are important. I offer my 
observations on them as a starting point, not a self-evidently correct solution. 
 16. For me, this individual has no gender. However, the genderless pronoun 
“it,” while in some ways attractive, is surely inappropriate. In the interest of 
clarity, because I am male, I have chosen to use the female. My choice should not 
be taken to imply anything about with which Aristotelian teachers I have spoken, 
or to imply that female teachers are by nature Aristotelian. 
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emulate her. Yet by failing to emulate her, they cut 
themselves off from a good deal of what she has to offer as a 
teacher: everything she models, everything she embodies—
that is to say, the most valuable things she possesses and is 
capable of sharing. For such a teacher, success depends 
fundamentally upon her students’ willingness to say to 
themselves one thing, and one thing only: “Here is a good 
lawyer. I want to be like her.” Everything else follows from 
that, and nothing is possible without it. 
Proceeding from this premise, the Aristotelian teacher 
affirms that in order to teach a student critical thinking, that 
student, to accept the lesson, must first accept that the 
teacher is capable of thinking critically in a way that is worth 
emulating—that the teacher is not, for example, just a 
liberal, or a Democrat, or un-American, or self-important or 
a complete jerk, and so that what that teacher is teaching 
really is critical thinking—the genuine concept—and not 
merely some whiny rant that can be written off and ignored. 
Thus, for such a teacher, her character is her most valuable 
asset. She cannot teach the lessons she really wants to teach 
unless she can be perceived as someone authentically 
capable of delivering it. 
Questions of purpose aside, assuming that they can ever 
be set aside, the phenomenology of the Aristotelian teacher’s 
ideal teaching involves being “in the zone”—attaining a level 
of contextual awareness and in-the-moment mastery that 
allows the teacher to direct things wherever she wants them 
to go, even if she is in some trivial sense extemporizing (at 
least that is how it feels, even if it’s an illusion). “In the zone,” 
teaching is one of the great liberating pleasures. When, from 
time to time, the pleasure is absent, when in her lowest 
moments, such a teacher feels unsuited to the task at hand. 
The Aristotelian teacher, consistent with the 
understanding of the American university offered above, 
knows that once there were plenty of students who believed 
in the value of critical thinking, who had internalized it as a 
way of life, who aspired to improve the quality and 
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persuasiveness of their critical thinking, and who recognized 
her services as valuable. However, such a teacher sometimes 
believes that we no longer inhabit a society in which critical 
thinking is valued and so there is a stark difference between 
her generation and the current one. Her generation did not 
reject conformity tout court (though they said they did), but 
they did reject as illegitimate a life lived in slavery to a 
certain kind of corporate consumerism. That we have 
choices, that we have the freedom to refuse to do what we are 
told—these were their insights. 
In contrast, the generation now sitting in law school 
classrooms has different instincts. They do not reject slavery, 
but on the contrary seek enthusiastically to enslave 
themselves as quickly and completely as possible. They do 
not wish even the illusion of freedom of choice in fashion, 
music, gadgets, politics, ideology, or anything else; they want 
precisely what they are told (in every waking moment, alas) 
to want. The idea that not wanting these things is even a 
choice on the conceptual map is beyond not only their 
experience, but also their comprehension. Capitalism has 
indeed finally consumed itself: those who mindfully built the 
pillars of consumerism have succeeded in creating a species 
of individual who lives, and can live, only to consume, no 
longer to build. 
The sense of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
establishing the Aristotelian relationship between teacher 
and student makes it difficult for a teacher who accepts, 
indeed embraces, such a relationship to experience the 
concomitant Aristotelian sense of life in which, for the 
virtuous person, desire is in harmony with practical reason. 
And, it is this sense of harmony of desire and reason that is 
essential to a life well lived. Thus, if the point of teaching is 
the demonstration, and so transmission, of the skill of critical 
reasoning and the student is incapable of acquiring this skill, 
or somehow sees it as irrelevant, then the teacher cannot 
properly teach. The activity is literally pointless and so 
might well be abandoned as unworthy of either party. Each 
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might better pursue some other objective. 
In contrast, I am not an Aristotelian. I believe in neither 
nature nor essence, though have always a bit jealous of those 
who do. A true child of the Sixties, though not a chronological 
one, I have never seen a role that I wholeheartedly wished to 
occupy, much less to inspire others to occupy, at least in any 
conventional way. Indeed, for me the point of critical 
thinking is challenging, if not destroying, such roles, such 
understandings of appropriate behavior. And, I have never 
known a harmonious existence and long ago gave up on even 
its possibility. A fragmented, conflicted life is all I can 
envision. The notion of being taken as a master, someone 
whose attributes a student might wish to emulate, frightens 
me. At most, I wish to be seen as a learner just a bit farther 
down the road toward understanding and so at times 
something as simple as being called “Professor” can bring the 
filing of a stern demurrer with the observation, “I profess 
nothing and the notion that I do would deeply offend anyone 
who actually did.” 
Instead, I teach, first, because doing so is fun—it brings 
me joy, or at least still does from time to time. Second, I teach 
because teaching is also a contribution to the civilization that 
tolerates me, an activity undertaken in exchange for the time 
to write. I am not therefore unserious. For me, learning has 
always been fun, but serious, often hard fun. Indeed, 
knowing how hard learning is, I find it difficult to 
understand how or why, after some point in school, possibly 
somewhere between tenth and twelfth grade, anyone might 
continue to study a subject beyond a desultory introduction, 
unless it was at least interesting, even if not fun. 
As it is interesting to learn, to come to understand, how 
people do things in the world, it was for just this reason that 
I was attracted to law as a practice. Law is fun because on 
the surface it is a very complicated, multifarious practice, 
and yet underneath, it can be reduced to a rather simple set 
of concerns, “a powerful theory” as I like to say. For my entire 
teaching career, I have more, but often less, successfully 
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tried to identify that theory and communicate it to my 
students. 
As I indicated earlier, my image as a teacher is of 
someone who comes to class, not to teach, and especially not 
to convey information, but to help students learn. Thus, I am 
most comfortable in a large classroom answering questions, 
not asking them, in an attempt to help students come to 
understand what they might have learned from the material 
assigned for the day. The underlying theory is simple. If 
bewilderment can be removed, learning may more likely take 
place. Of course, such an understanding of the law 
professor’s role depends on the willingness of law students, 
many of whom are twenty-two years old, to take charge of 
their education, to be available to learning, a phrase that I 
have derived from David Matza’s work.17 
Matza speaks of adolescents as available to delinquency, 
as individuals for whom delinquency is one of a range of life 
options that might plausibly be explored.18 During all of my 
years as an academic, I have experienced students who were 
clearly, even passionately available to learning. These 
students were, and still are, a joy to have in class. They have, 
however, never been the majority in any large class. The 
majority has never been available to learning. It still is 
unwilling to take charge of its education. Unfortunately, 
while in the seventies the minority of students who were 
available to learning was respectably large and so 
established the tone of the classroom experience, as the 
eighties passed slowly into the 2010s, that minority slowly 
declined in numbers. Now it is seldom sufficient to set the 
tone in any classroom where helping students to learn is the 
dominant objective. 
The decline in the percentage of students available to 
learning that an Aristotelian teacher might experience is 
just as big an obstacle for what I choose to do in the classroom 
 
 17. DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 69 (1964). 
 18. Id. 
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as it is for her, though in a different way. This is because the 
object of my teaching is different from the Aristotelian’s. I 
respect her understanding of the importance of character for 
teaching law and learning what it is to be a lawyer, as well 
as her objective of teaching critical thinking. However, for 
me, character implies a role dependence that I have a 
difficulty accepting, much less exhibiting for others, and 
though I try to help students improve their limited skills in 
critical thinking, such an activity is a mediate objective. For 
me, the ultimate objective of critical thinking is to help 
students to begin to exercise judgment, an attitude toward 
law that is different from, but related to, the Aristotelian’s 
emphasis on coming to understand the character required to 
be a good lawyer. It is judgment that distinguishes the office 
of a lawyer from that of a tollgate operator. And so, the point 
of the practice of law may best be seen as the use critical 
thinking about first, the vast background of institutions, 
understood historically, structurally, culturally, and 
philosophically, that pervade human activity, next, about the 
foreground of client desires, and finally about the available 
scraps and pieces of rule systems, as a basis from which to 
fashion an effective arrangement that harmonizes, as best as 
can be done, all three. This is what judgment does and its 
exercise equips a practitioner with the ability to distinguish 
that course of action that “will work” from that course of 
action which “isn’t likely to work” and especially to identify 
the third, fourth, or fifth alternative course of action that at 
first might be rejected, but in the end may seem to be “just 
the thing.” 
The subject of judgment can be various: a merger, a 
regulatory filing, a financing package, a property settlement, 
a plea agreement, a complaint, a brief, a trial strategy, the 
structure of a financial instrument, or a business plan. All 
require judgment, a matter of more or less, a matter of taking 
ownership of a problem and so accepting responsibility for 
the quality of the solution proffered, rather than merely 
deferring to “the law.” More crudely put, it is the act of 
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putting one’s butt on the line. A lawyer who exercises 
judgment accepts the risk that the advice given will be less 
than optimum, even wrong, and so accepts the blame that 
follows from poor judgment. Thus, for the exercise of 
judgment—as distinguished from “just” filing routine 
papers—a lawyer is entitled to be paid well, even when no 
question of malpractice could possibly arise. 
Unfortunately, most of my students seem not only 
uninterested in exercising judgment, they are absolutely 
adverse to it. Somehow instinctively understanding that they 
are likely to be fodder for someone else’s war, they just want 
to put in their hours and get paid. Their preference is for 
what my one-time colleague Tom Disare called “the risk-free 
practice of law,” even though they also somehow know that 
it is only by taking responsibility for their work that they 
have the chance to secure the semi-permanent employment 
that has been the object they have been seeking for all the 
years on the treadmill that is K–16 education. 
Trying to convince these students to accept the 
obligation of exercising judgment is very hard, often futile 
work. This work has been made harder by their palpable 
longing to continue to do what they have been taught to do 
for so many years by an educational system that has done a 
rather wonderful job of socializing students into American 
life, but has done a truly awful job of providing them with 
the tools necessary for critical thinking, all the while 
regularly grading and sorting them on the basis of the ability 
to do what they are told for intentionally predictable 
rewards. 
Why this is so is relatively easy to understand. For years 
of education, nothing has been asked of those who become 
my students. Of course, in this statement, I use “asked” in a 
particular way. Nothing open-ended has been asked of them. 
I readily acknowledge that in fact much has been asked, but 
only in a peculiar, routinized form. For most of my students, 
for most of their education up until they reach my classroom, 
they are regularly asked to do the following task. The teacher 
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tells the student exactly what is to be taught, preferably in 
clear outline form, so that the student knows exactly what 
needs to be mastered, and how mastery, defined as the 
receipt and retention of information, will be tested, most 
often in a way that makes easy the transfer of the 
information from an outline to the test. This is a popular art 
form in that it makes it easy to grade students and provides 
a handy defense to objections directed toward the accuracy 
of that grading on the part of those helicopter parents who 
believe that their Dick or Jane is destined to be great because 
they are already “perfect,” or would be were they adequately 
taught.19 
Most students are also asked to master the skill that is 
the response paper, of saying something “smart” in response 
to a carefully chosen, generally bland and so inoffensive, 
“prompt.” Such exercises are justified as allowing for 
creativity and self-expression and so not graded, or if graded, 
generally graded in terms of the relevance of the response to 
the prompt, the intellectual equivalent of learning to color 
within the lines. 
Both of these skills are moderately useful, but emphasis 
on such varieties of learning entails a rather unfortunate 
consequence. Students find that doing what they are told and 
so eschewing the exercise of individual judgment is not their 
second nature, but their only nature. Never having been 
allowed to set their own goals except in trivial matters—I 
really want to go to this or that movie—they find it all but 
impossible to figure out how one might engage in critical 
thinking as way of exercising judgment. 
In some ways, I am not surprised by this pattern to K–
16 education; my education was much the same until 
 
 19. Given this understanding of learning, it is not surprising that when asked 
to do a research project, that project is defined as the collection and ordering of 
material assembled for the purpose—you must have six, eight, ten, . . . pick a 
number, sources, properly cited in your bibliography—thus reducing a possible 
exercise of judgment to a glorified scavenger hunt. 
466 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
towards the end of high school.20 However, by then, the 
importance of critical thinking, of looking at accepted 
understandings of things in the world from the outside/in the 
third person/critically, though we never used any of those 
locutions, was increasing stressed. And in college, after 
completing the introductory courses in most any field other 
than math or science, critical thinking was the point of most 
courses offered by most instructors. 
However, if I am to judge on the basis of my experience 
of most of my students, emphasis on critical thinking as an 
educational objective seems no longer to be experienced by 
many students in many majors at many colleges, regardless 
of whatever an individual department or the university as a 
whole may say in its advertising brochures. When asked to 
respond to any material or faced with an open-ended task—
be it doctrinal, where it would take years of work to master 
it all, were that even possible, or worse, processual—work to 
become a good lawyer or to exercise judgment—students, and 
not just first year students, seem to think that the task 
identified is to repeat what the material said and so are 
bewildered when they discover that this is not the case. At 
best, they are indignant that that they should not have been 
told or cannot quickly find the answer before any question is 
asked. Very often, and not wholly surprisingly, such students 
freak. All they have to damp down the panic are their old, 
tried and true skills, and they complain bitterly when it 
becomes apparent that such skills are simply not up to the 
task placed before them. Rationalization often follows: “I just 
need to work harder with my existing skills; this teacher is 
just hiding the important secrets from me.” Or overt denial: 
“This can’t be what the practice of law is about; this teacher 
is simply out of it.” 
Those who do not freak often attempt to reinterpret the 
task as requiring the oral equivalent of a response paper, as 
perhaps an occasion for law school “policy” analysis. If 
 
 20. Thankfully, the response paper did not then exist. 
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deprived of this possibility, students have a hard time 
understanding that there might be anything else they could 
do. If it finally dawns on them that they are required to 
exercise independent judgment based on critical thought, 
they mostly recoil in horror as if some sanctum sanctorum 
had been invaded, as if the task was far harder than even 
asking someone of another gender to dance at the first 
middle school party. Even worse, some students confuse 
critical thought with the contemporary version of critique, a 
version that Kant could not have possibly identified with, 
that offers stereotypical understandings of why 
interpersonal, social, or economic life is radically deficient 
with respect to some aspect of an assumedly “natural” order. 
I have a certain amount of sympathy for these responses 
from the majority of my students and for three reasons. First, 
I would be dumbfounded were it to turn out to be the case 
that so many of my students were congenitally incapable of 
critical thought. It is far more likely that they suffer from a 
college education that failed to stress the importance of such 
open-ended thought. Whether the reason for this 
marginalization of such thought is the diminution of the size 
of college faculties as administration takes over the 
campuses, the obsession of faculty with the necessity of time 
for research, a fear of faculty and administrators alike of 
exercising judgment themselves and so of offering judgments 
about their student’s thought, the preference of one and all 
to avoid the trouble of individualizing education that an 
emphasis on critical thinking necessarily implies, the social 
reduction of the college and the college degree to a credential, 
or even all of these quite obviously related aspects of higher 
education today, I surely cannot establish. However, I am 
sure that this marginalization is what daily I face in my 
teaching and it makes me sad. 
Second, the great social and economic shift that has 
turned the acquisition of a professional degree from the mark 
of membership in the upper-middle class to but a ticket to 
the possibility of such class membership has meant that 
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protecting one’s GPA, long a staple of an undergraduate life 
spent managing the college experience,21 is now just an 
ordinary part of a life spent managing the law school 
experience, at least at all but maybe the most elite few law 
schools. The time required to begin to be able to learn with 
but minimal help, to make oneself available to learn, to start 
working on being a good lawyer who is capable of exercising 
sound judgment founded in critical thinking skills, quite 
obviously detracts from time spent worrying about grades, 
fattening one’s resume with activities and employment 
experiences, as well as having fun, mating, and even dating. 
Learning is thus easily tossed overboard, yet again 
postponed until . . . until some other dimly perceived future 
when there will be time for such things. 
Third, to be caught on an educational treadmill for at 
least the nineteen years from kindergarten through the bar 
exam is surely an exhausting educational marathon. And, 
“please keep it simple” is a plausible prayer as the finish line 
approaches. However, most lawyers will spend some portion 
of the rest of their lives confronting open-ended tasks that 
require the exercise of critical thinking skills, among them 
learning on their own. Surely, by the time a student enters 
law school, it is necessary to begin to engage in such 
activities, lest the necessary effort at learning, and hopefully 
mastery, take place at a client’s expense. 
Sympathy might ever be my dominant response to my 
students were it not for one other crucial detail. Just when is 
such learning going to start? When will judgment be 
acquired? And, at whose expense? These are important 
questions for a law teacher. We attempt to prepare students 
for the practice of law, not for practicing doing law on paying, 
much less nonpaying, clients. 
How does one who is without an Aristotelian teacher’s 
grounding, evaluate the plausibility of the teacher’s task in 
 
 21. REBEKAH NATHAN, MY FRESHMAN YEAR (2005) is excellent on the topic of 
students “managing college.” 
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such circumstances? The question for me is not whether one 
can be a teacher in any given set of circumstances, but 
whether being a teacher in a given set of circumstances is a 
tolerable task rather than a pure sinecure of the “I pretend 
to teach and they pretend to learn” variety, something 
unworthy of even an ill-ordered life tolerably lived—
something so devoid of joy that one is no longer capable of 
honestly believing that one is making a contribution to the 
civilization that tolerates one in exchange for the time to 
write. 
In answering this question, I know that I cannot just 
consider the exchange made—teaching for writing. I must 
also consider the situation of the individuals not placed, but 
thrust into my care. They did not create the world in which 
they find themselves and it is highly doubtful that they 
would have chosen it had they been given a choice. It is ugly 
to find oneself in a world where social advance, or even 
maintenance of social position, requires twenty years of an 
education that is not intrinsically attractive leading to not 
very secure employment opportunities doing work that is not 
all that interesting. And so, I believe that it is important to 
recognize a possible obligation derived from the fact that I 
benefited from experiencing a world of both study and 
practice that presented a far less demoralizing prospect than 
the one my students today experience. It helps that, in a real 
sense, I like my students and would be more than willing to 
express such affection were they open to it. But it is not clear 
that that liking is enough. Understanding, even when 
combined with affection, does not equate with psychic 
reward. From the front of the room, the decline in the size of 
the group of students available to learning is as dispiriting 
to me as is the increasing difficulty of establishing the proper 
relationship between teacher and student for the 
Aristotelian figment of my imagination. So, it is time to 
return to Sicily and Tennessee and see whether these 
fictional places can help illuminate the real problems that a 
law teacher may face today. 
470 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
VI 
 Though my Aristotelian figment and I start from very 
different understandings of what it is to teach, at this point 
we find ourselves arguably lamenting the passing of an 
understanding of what a life in the law should be that each 
experienced to some extent, but should have then understood 
was waning, not waxing. Both worry that the idea of the law 
school that we know and love is “the centenarian being 
dragged in a Bath chair” around a new world—human, 
economic, and educational—”understanding nothing,” and 
sad, if not embarrassed, to be so close to channeling Ortega 
y Gasset22 in order to avoid the usual cliché about dead 
languages and Oxbridge. 
Still, it is a position that cannot be escaped. Nor should 
it be. It is impossible to get as angry at the present world of 
law teaching as we are without having deeply embraced the 
job it implies. As such, I, and my Aristotelian figment, still 
love the task of “guiding others” and note no change in the 
intellectual quality of our students over the years of teaching 
beyond that attributable to the sometimes random, lately 
less so, variation around the norm. So, we are not in that 
sense unhappy with our students. Rather, the change that 
we do note over the years, the change that both angers and 
saddens, is the significant change in students’ attitude 
toward learning. And thus, we feel obliged to deal with the 
changing circumstances under which we undertake to teach. 
In seeking to explore the implied alternatives, we return to 
Don Fabrizio and Ella, Tancredi and Chuck. 
 
The choices that Tancredi and Chuck make are for me 
and my Aristotelian figment impossible, but they need to be 
addressed for just that reason. Tancredi chose to embrace the 
abhorrent future because it was the lesser of two evils; “If we 
 
 22. JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 15, 65 (Anonymous 
Trans., 1932) (1930). 
2018] TO DRESS FOR DINNER 471 
want things to stay as they are, things must change.”23 
Chuck faced a more ambiguous choice. While he came to 
understand that the destruction of Ella’s way of life was 
unfortunate, whether he came to agree with her that the 
changes the TVA was bringing to the valley were the greater 
evil or whether the white supremacist, good ole country boys 
who had tried to run him off represented that evil is not at 
all clear. And so, the meaning of Chuck’s high-tailing it back 
to Washington with his new wife in tow is not clear either. 
But, run he did, and on a fancy new airplane—a detail that 
suggests that, for him, the past was the greater evil, in which 
case he, like Tancredi, chose to embrace the future. 
The deep perspectivalist view of life inherent in the 
actions of these young men provides a helpful check on facile 
theorizing. What is so wrong with the bureaucratization of 
the practice of law? What is the evil to which it might be the 
lesser alternative? It seems doubtful that the greater evil is 
the abandonment of law. There seems to be no culture 
without norms and some mechanism for enforcing them. The 
norms may be abhorrent. The mechanism may be more or 
less effective. But law there will be. 
Instead, it seems more likely that the greater evil is the 
possibility that a fully bureaucratic law would be a system 
without play, without the space for tailoring the rules of law 
to people and circumstances, a place where no one might be 
able to build Ella a house on the hill above the river with a 
porch for her rocking chair. This would be the hell where, in 
Grant Gilmore’s words, “there will be nothing but law, and 
due process will be meticulously observed,”24 a truly 
totalitarian alternative, a system where categories 
determine everything and all persons and their behavior are 
already categorized. 
In contrast, at some level, legal incompleteness allows 
the hope that a system in which lawyers may do their work, 
 
 23. DI LAMPEDUSA, supra note 1, at 40. 
 24. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977). 
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one that possibly may be manipulated, one in which in 
Leonard Cohen’s words, “There’s a crack, a crack in 
everything. That’s how the light gets in,”25 might indicate the 
possibility of the individualized “better,” “more just” 
outcomes I worked for in practice. Many Aristotelians did 
too. It is a place where a really good lawyer might make a 
really good argument, a place where judgment might be 
exercised. And, it is in consequence a place where self-
conscious, critical reflection might lead to the belief that 
character matters, and thus that individual agency may play 
some role, however slight, in remaking the world. 
If this is so, if a fully bureaucratic law is the greater evil 
to be feared, then neither my Aristotelian figment nor I can 
imitate Tancredi and Chuck. We cannot run toward the 
future that, as Don Fabrizio knew, needed “bright young 
men, with minds asking ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ and who are 
good at masking, at blending . . . their personal interests 
with vague public ideals.”26 No longer is the optimism that 
sought the growth of modestly democratic government, as 
well as modestly benign regulatory guidance, available to us. 
To paraphrase Pogo, “we have seen the future and it is us.”27 
And so we must face the differing postures of Don Fabrizio 
and Ella Garth toward an unpalatable future. 
Of the two, it is Ella’s actions that are the more 
surprising. The Don allows aristocratic privilege to do the 
tough work of opposition for him; he may affect aged 
tiredness or aged wisdom as he wishes—“being dragged in a 
Bath Chair around the Great Exhibition.”28 He allows rank 
to set aside discomforting questions, secure in the knowledge 
that while his patrimony will continue to decline, for the 
present, his position will not be questioned. He may in this 
 
 25. LEONARD COHEN, ANTHEM (Columbia Records 1992). 
 26. DI LAMPEDUSA, supra note 1, at 209. 
 27. See Walt Kelly, Pogo Earth Day Poster (Apr. 22 1970) (originally, Pogo 
said, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”). 
 28. DI LAMPEDUSA, supra note 1, at 205. 
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sense continue to “dress for dinner.” In contrast, Ella has 
nothing but her person to hold the world at bay. Implacable, 
stubborn, used to being obeyed and in her own way 
respected, she has nothing to fall back on. When the Don 
retreats to his country estate, he can retreat in style, a 
caravan of coaches and a retinue of servants to pack bags and 
lead the way. Ella has only a small suitcase. She relies on no 
one, unwilling even to allow her granddaughter to carry her 
bag. Like the Don, used to being obeyed, she orders Chuck to 
get moving when he, perhaps ruefully, lags behind. 
There is, of course, no federal marshal ordering either 
my Aristotelian figment or me to get out of the way of 
progress, as the marshal did by evicting Ella from her 
island.29 Tenure means one may teach until the drool 
becomes too apparent, if not beyond. Still, it is important to 
highlight the attitudinal difference between Don Fabrizio 
and Ella Garth. The Don, lacking “the faculty of self-
deception, essential requisite for wanting to guide others,” 
asks only to be left alone to do that small bit of education that 
he feels he is required to do.30 The world may easily make a 
path around him. Ella stands squarely across the world’s 
path and will step aside for no one and nothing, except in the 
face of superior force. However, her attitude is made easier 
by the fact that she has no more education she can do. Her 
boys, actually nephews, clearly never learned anything 
except to be afraid of her and the negroes have learned what 
she could teach and await only her leave to depart. 
And so there remains the irreducible nub of the problem 
that faces my Aristotelian figment and I—whether it is more 
 
 29. At about this point, my readers will surely have begun to ask why I am 
keeping up with the awful locution “my Aristotelian figment and I.” Why not say 
“law teachers” and be done with it? The reason is simple. As I suggested earlier, 
there are all sorts of ways to deal with the problem I am attempting to address. 
In addition to embracing the future, others that come to mind are burying one’s 
head in the sand, burying one’s head in scholarship, self-deception and political 
activism. I could not write a proper apologia for any of these alternatives. And so, 
I stick to the two positions I can modestly defend. 
 30. DI LAMPEDUSA, supra note 1, at 209. 
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honorable to assume that the world will be content to make 
a path around those who find themselves in its course, 
around us, or to stand in the way recognizing that superior 
force will eventually move us out of that course? Is it best to 
dress for dinner, as did Don Fabrizio, or to close the door and 
ignore the shouting outside, as did Ella? 
 
Initially, this question can be avoided briefly by 
remembering that routine activity is less costly than its 
alternative. Interchangeable parts for the manufacture of 
rifles and the assembly line for the manufacture of cars 
reduced the cost of both items substantially. The cost of legal 
services is an outrage. The cost of a middle class lifestyle 
grows apace; an upper-middle class lifestyle is rapidly 
becoming out of reach, even for professionals. The further 
bureaucratization of legal practice will at least put off the 
day when legal services can only be delivered to persons or 
institutions that comprise the economic royalty or to those 
that a government chooses to favor with a subsidy. Any such 
putting off is probably a good thing. In this way, our students’ 
desire for the risk-free practice of law, their wish to avoid 
confronting what it is to be a really good lawyer and their 
hope to eschew judgment by embracing bureaucratic legal 
practice is probably good for the social welfare of the 
community concerned. 
Whether it is an honorable thing for a teacher to tolerate 
such behavior is another matter. An Aristotelian law teacher 
would address three possible alternatives as follows. First, 
one might simply abandon the field—that is, leave law 
teaching altogether to pursue some other occupation. When 
the population of students neither values nor desires what 
the teacher believes to be the greatest gift she has to offer, 
the teacher is obsolete in the most complete sense of the 
term, so what else is there to do but step aside? The main 
feasible alternative would be to return to the practice of law, 
an endeavor that perhaps continues to offer some occasional 
and scattered opportunities for honorable living, at least to 
2018] TO DRESS FOR DINNER 475 
the truly skilled. And for some, this is a live option—for they 
are still very good lawyers, and the market for very good 
lawyering has not yet entirely disappeared (if it ever will). 
Reverting to one’s roots in practice might allow such 
individuals to follow a path more like Don Fabrizio’s, 
producing beautifully crafted work for an ever-shrinking 
number of connoisseurs who will pay good money for it. After 
a period of lucrative practice, one might be able to acquire 
some moderately comfortable retirement home someplace 
warm. 
As part of this alternative, there might even be the nasty, 
yet delicious fantasy of belatedly teaching students who did 
not come to law school to learn how to be good lawyers, and 
succeeded. An Aristotelian teacher could envision meeting 
some of these derelicts in litigation and instantiating good 
lawyering for them in a different way: by wiping the 
courthouse floor with them. Still, such a lawyer might 
wonder whether this activity might actually provide much 
pleasure. It is not obvious that such ill-prepared law school 
graduates are even capable of recognizing when they are 
getting their asses kicked, an experience that demands the 
recipient have at least some vague ability to recognize 
artistry, even when it is inflicted on this no longer student’s 
own sorry, ill-constructed, poorly supported case. 
A second option is to bend so as not to break. This is the 
kind of response, well known in today’s academy, which 
demands that teachers “engage” their students by any means 
necessary. If the students expect technology, give it to them. 
If they want answers rather than questions, provide answers 
and stifle the questions. If they think one should be available 
around the clock, make one’s self available. If they think it is 
reasonable to ask one to repeat a 45-minute lecture in one’s 
office for their own private consumption, then it is 
reasonable, and one should cheerfully do so. Ask of students 
only what they are willing to give. Treat them like 
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consumers, and the customer is always right.31 This is a 
response, in other words, that allocates the burden of 
behavior modification entirely onto the teacher; students are 
fine—no, not merely fine; complete—just the way they walk 
in the door. 
Surely an Aristotelian teacher would find this 
alternative abhorrent. Knowing the kind of behavior that is 
required of good lawyers, and how to inculcate that behavior 
in other human beings, such a teacher thinks she has a 
better plan for transmitting mastery of his subject than her 
students have for receiving it. This confidence is justified by 
experience, knowledge, and results. Pandering is the 
definition of dishonorable behavior in such a teacher; she will 
not do it. 
That seems to leave only one option: fighting the world 
in place, while courting the risk of being broken. This was 
Ella’s strategy, and an Aristotelian teacher might well 
develop a pattern of action such as the following. Ban laptops 
in classes. Count professionalism for twenty percent of the 
grade in first-year courses. Use technology only when it 
makes achievement of teaching goals easier, which is only 
sometimes. Refuse to post things on the web merely because 
students ask, but do so only for perceived pedagogical 
benefit. Distribute a carefully thought out syllabus stuffed 
full of information and hold students accountable for its 
contents. Be direct and even blunt when providing 
evaluations of performance. Maintain no presence on 
Facebook at the knowing risk that for a certain kind of 
student (and even for a certain kind of colleague) one 
therefore does not fully exist. In doing these things, such a 
teacher would fulfill the role of law professor, that is to say, 
would act in accordance with her own understanding of what 
 
 31. Never mind that this idea flows from a kind of sad Boomer ahistoricism. 
In fact, people under twenty-five treat you with the same degree of self-involve-
ment regardless of which side of the counter they happen to occupy. The idea that 
the customer is always right—and should therefore receive good and responsive 
service—is one that is held mostly by people middle-aged and older. 
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constitutes an excellent performance, judged solely by her 
and based on her own conviction that on that subject, if even 
on none other, she still knows what she is talking about. And, 
on the day on which she ceases to feel that way, hope she will 
have the courage to pursue the first option described above—
walking out the door. 
 
In contrast, I can only see two choices. The idea of taking 
up the practice of law again is ludicrous, and I am quite sure 
that such is not a reasonable alternative for most other law 
professors—the overly inbred show dogs that almost all are. 
Nor have I any willingness to pander to my students’ 
asserted needs. Such an alternative demeans student and 
teacher alike. So I am left with the stark choice between Ella 
and the Don. Though I respect the Aristotelian urge to 
channel Ella Garth, I cannot do it. Such an alternative is 
unavailable to one who is not Aristotelian, though possibly 
an Existentialist.32 So I am left to imitate—to channel is 
impossible—Don Fabrizio. 
To do the best one can is all that one can be asked to do 
as a teacher, “to struggle to ignore parts of the given 
structure of life,” as a colleague once put it. Pushing water 
up hill is not something that most humans are able to do. I 
know that I am not good at it. I can never hide 
disappointment at a given student’s performance in class 
and long ago stopped trying. Thus, the bureaucratization of 
law, together with the tendency of law students to treat a law 
degree as a credential and only secondarily as a learning 
experience, just might be a gift to those teachers like me who 
still see the practice of law as a species of handicraft. I teach 
as if law were a species of handicraft, and for those who 
might possibly so understand it. The trick then—Don 
Fabrizio’s trick—is at the same time to harbor no illusions 
about what is being learned, as well as no regrets that other 
 
 32. Errol Meidinger made this suggestion, which is not wrong, though it may 
not be right. 
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things are not being learned. Teach for the handcrafters, 
those who are willing, however hesitantly, to take the risk of 
exercising judgment, but grade for the credentialists, since 
the handcrafters will need the credential too. 
But is such a lesson to be learned from Don Fabrizio, if 
it is the lesson he teaches, an honorable practice? Can 
temporizing between the past and the future ever be 
honorable? I believe that it can. The choice to be a teacher is 
not a choice to give up one’s soul, something Ella Garth in 
her different way knew. At the same time, it does carry with 
it an obligation to treat students with a certain amount of 
respect, knowing that there will often be a difference 
between the respect that students believe that their views 
are entitled to receive and the teacher’s understanding of the 
question of dueness. In this circumstance, when that 
difference cannot be bridged, it is at least possible to accord 
each a certain space—for the teacher to accord students the 
ability to move on and for the students to indulge the 
teacher’s wish to dress for dinner, as it were, with such 
students who wish to dress for dinner as well. 
I recognize that from my first semester of teaching I have 
faced this problem of differing perceptions about what 
needed to be known in order to become a lawyer—in my 
place, the rudiments of pre-trial practice; in theirs, personal 
jurisdiction and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. I taught 
what I thought important and lectured what they thought 
important. Neither party was very happy, but I graded 
generously, and so my students just grumbled rather than 
started looking for tar and feathers. In most of my classes for 
most of the many years since that experience, I have made 
similar choices. Indeed, it is a choice emphasized by two 
posters that graced my office for years: one was in Russian 
from the years of the New Economic Program that, loosely 
translated, exhorted the peasants to “[p]ull out weeds” and, 
in the other, Snoopy noted, “I did not take this job just to rap 
with the birds.” 
For this reason, of course, I would not be surprised if 
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others greeted my claim of honorable conduct with a certain 
amount of suspicion. No one would ever say that I am a 
popular teacher and almost all of the compliments about my 
teaching have been delivered by former students, then 
practicing lawyers, five or ten or even forty years after the 
horrible experience. “I hated the course, but in time came to 
understand and use what you were trying to teach us,” is a 
not uncommon refrain. Thus, I see—understanding is a far, 
far different matter—that the bureaucratic history of the 
university and the economic embeddedness of the experience 
of my students create limits to what I may accomplish when 
working with them. And yet, they do not determine what, as 
a teacher, I must do. For me, teaching is another example of 
the Sisyphean struggle with the rock. A life well lived is not 
the struggle to collect the most toys, but to keep pushing the 
rock up the hill until gravity gets not just the rock, but also 
the pusher. That is enough, for the Existentialist in me at 
least. 
 
Neither the Aristotelian figment of my imagination nor I 
would argue with the other’s evaluation of these 
alternatives. Both would, however, continue to ask, “shall we 
dress for dinner or simply close the door until we are forced 
to leave our island?” That is a good question for law 
professors to face up to as U.S. News & World Report, the 
Association of American Law Schools, the United States 
Department of Education, the American Bar Association, our 
own universities, and sometimes our own schools are busy 
further diminishing the possible breadth of the activity of 
teaching law. 
